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PART II.

It was suggested in the first part of this article that, in
strictness, incorporation has to do with modes of action and
not with consequences of action. The corporation problem
as presented at common law concerns the right of associates
to act in the common name and to sue in it, their amenability
to suits instituted against them in that name and their right
to receive and make in that name conveyances of property
real and personal. The idea that incorporation has of itself
an effect upon liability for acts done is of late development.
Our corporation law would probably be sounder and would
certainly be simpler if such an idea had found no place in it.
Suppose that A, B, and C, an unincorporated group, make
a contract in their common name with E, F, and G, a similar
group. E, F, and G break the contract and A, B, and C
bring suit in their common name against E, F, and G in
their common name. Two questions of course arise: first,
whether a contract thus made is enforceable; and, second,
whether the suit may be maintained otherwise than in the
name of the individual plaintiffs against the individual
defendants. We are accustomed to make two mistakes in
attempting a solution of such problems as these. First, we
say that both questions must be answered in the negative
unless both groups are "incorporated." Second, we assume
that if these questions could be answered in the affirmative it
would necessarily follow that the associates must possess
additional rights and privileges to those directly involved,
on the theory that there are certain "corporate rights" which
are always found together. Now a careful reading of the
books shows that both these views are mistaken. The right
to contract in a common name and to sue in it was a right
which existed at common law in the case of many groups not
incorporated.' Moreover, it sometimes happened that unin' See the case cited in the introduction to Kyd on Corporations of
"the Abbot of Burgh's men" v. "Prince Edward's men," in 44 Hen.
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corporated associates were recognized as having one priv2
ilege which we call corporate without possessing others.
If, therefore, when a problem arises respecting the right
to act in a common name we consider merely the reasonableness of recognizing the right so to act under the circumstances of the particular case, we shall have both principle
and authority on our side. We may, in a given case, conclude that the existence of the right should be recognized
even if the associates are not incorporated. Obviously, therefore, the right may sometimes be conceded to exist even if
they are irregularly incorporated. If we successively enumerate the familiar privileges of collective action the question
may arise as to when the point is reached, at which we can
say that the associates are knit together like members of a
single body,--i.e., are incorporated. The answer is that
they become incorporated when, and only when, the possibility of individual action has been eliminated and action to
bind the group can be taken only by official representatives
acting in the common name. 3 The corporation, in other
words, is any group organized strictly on representative
principles. Whether such organization will be sanctioned
without state license is really an economic and not a legal
question.
With this further statement of the point of view from
which these articles are written, we resume the orderly consideration of the points at issue.
II. THE RIGHT TO ACT IN THE COMMON NAME.-Problems under this head may arise in various ways. A plaintiff
may seek to question the right of associates regularly incorIII

(1259).
Kyd says of this case (p. 12) that it is a proof "that the
capacity of contracting in a collective capacity was not, in ancient times,
confined to a corporation." Kyd wrote in 1794.
' "If the king grant to the men of Islington that they shall be discharged of toll, this incorporates them to the purpose of being quit of
toll, though it does not enable them to purchase land, etc.," 21 Ed. IV,
59 (482), cited by Kyd, p. 9, who in the course of his interesting "Introduction" mentions several other instances of the same conception.
'This, it is submitted, is the essential legal conception of a corporation. What kind of group is meant when the term " corporation" occurs
in a given statute is of course merely a problem of interpretation. No
two legislatures may have the same conception.
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porated to do an act alleged to be beyond the scope of the
charter; and such plaintiff may be either a stranger or himself a member of the group. If a stranger, he has no greater
rights than any other citizen and must proceed by application to the attorney-general. If he is a stockholder, he has
certain additional rights which it is not within the scope of
this paper to discuss.
On the other hand a plaintiff may challenge the right of
the associates to do any corporate act whatever on the
ground that their organization is irregular. This is the
problem which in this place it is proposed to consider. Here
again the plaintiff may be either a stranger or himself an
associate.
In cases of this class the right to take advantage of irregularities is uniformly denied. Obviously the estoppel and
contract theories are not available as grounds of decision.
Hence it has been usual to invoke the collateral attack doctrine or to dispose of the plaintiff's contention by the mere
statement that the associates are a corporation de facto. To
rest the decision upon the latter statement is, as has been
pointed out already, to give a name to a conclusion, but not
to make an explanation of it. If it is conceded to be unwise
to inquire in private litigation into the right of the associates
to act in corporate form, the ultimate reason for the rule
must be found in the recognition of incorporation attained
by private act and without state aid. To say that associates
have actually attained incorporation when they have organized an unlicensed corporation is not only intelligible, but it
is the only really satisfactory -explanation of the result. If
it be suggested that the result is satisfactorily explained by
the usual reference to the collateral attack rule, the answer
is that to invoke that rule is (as in the case of the appeal to
the corporation de facto) merely to shut off inquiry by
repeating a name. To say that the right of associates to act
in a certain way cannot be inquired into except at the instance
of the state is merely to assert a conclusion. If the reason
is asked for refusing to make the inquiry, the answer must
proceed on one of the two following lines: (I) The assodates have the right; they are either entitled to continue to

IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.

exercise it or they are not; if they are, the case is disposed
of; if they are not, the only effective way to control their
conduct is to institute a proceeding to deprive them of their
right because of its irregular acquisition; hence the refusal
to make the inquiry in a litigation in which the issue is too
narrow, in that only the relations of the plaintiff and the
associates can be adjusted and not those between the associates and the public. (2) Or the associates have not the
right which they claim; but the usurpation of it does not
affect the plaintiff more than it does any other citizen of the
community; hence the refusal to make the inquiry in a
litigation in which there is no good reason for allowing the
plaintiff to volunteer as a representative of the public. It
will be noted, however, that this latter answer fails to take
account of the case in which the plaintiff is peculiarly affected
by the usurpation complained of, a case, for example, analogous to the cases in which a single citizen is permitted to
sue for the abatement of a public nuisance.
It is conceived that no reason can be given for refusing
to inquire into the regularity of the organization excepting
one or the other of the reasons above suggested. Turning
now to the cases in which the right of associates to act in a
certain way has been questioned, we find that in many of
the cases plaintiffs have been met by one or the other of the
two answers just given, while in the other cases the courts
have shown a willingness to inquire into the authority of
the associates to act in the manner in question. An attentive consideration of the difference between the cases in
which the inquiry will and those in which it will not be
made will show the difference between the two to be thisthat where the right asserted by the associates is one which
is not an incident of incorporation the associates must show
a clear title to it by compliance with the conditions of the
grant; whereas if the right in question is an ordinary incident of incorporation, irregularity in corporate organization
is not material. The distinction, then, is between rights
which are and rights which are not incident to corporate
organization. As already pointed out, incorporation (properly speaking) concerns only the modes of representative
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action-suing and being sued in a common name, contracting, conveying property and receiving conveyances of property in that name, making by-laws, using a common seal,
etc. It is clear, therefore, that irregularity of organization
affords to a private plaintiff no ground upon which to enjoin
the associates from taking corporate action merely because
of their alleged lack of right to act in corporate form. This
it will be perceived is a result entirely consistent with the
idea that incorporation may be attained by private act and
without state aid. A plaintiff who undertakes to make an
objection based upon the form in which the associates act
should accordingly be met by the first of the two answers
outlined above: he should be told that the associates have
in virtue of their organization attained the right to act in
the mode in question, and that the only way in which they
can be deprived of such right is by a proceeding instituted
for that purpose by the state.
Far different is the situation which presents itself when
associates irregularly organized claim under a charter or
general law a right which is not ordinarily an incident of incorporation. Reasons have been given above for the view
that the limitation of liability is a right or privilege which
ought not to be regarded as incident to incorporation, but it
is conceded that the law is the other way. There are, however, a number of rights which confessedly do not belong
to associates merely because they incorporate. The right
of eminent domain is the most important of them. Suppose
that the associates are irregularly organized and that they
undertake to condemn private property for their corporate
use, a stranger who asks a court of equity to enjoin the associates will indeed be met by the second of the two answers
given above; that is to say, he will be told that he is not
entitled to equitable relief, for he is not affected by the
usurpation more than every other member of the public and
there is no reagon for allowing him to volunteer as a representative of the community. A property owner, however,
whose property the associates propose to take should unquestionably be allowed to enjoin their action on the ground
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that they have not satisfied the conditions upon which the
4
state has granted them the right.
The conclusion just reached respecting the difference
between cases in which regularity of organization will and
those in which it will not be inquired into is most significant,
because the conclusion is consistent with the theory that
mere incorporation (that is, a right to act in corporate
form) may be attained without state aid, but that the exercise of certain other and greater rights is not within the
reach of associates except upon compliance by them with
statutory conditions.
If now it be supposed that a number of associates irregularly organize themselves in corporate form under a statute
which purports to confer. not only the right to corporate organization but also the right of eminent domain, it will follow that non-compliance with the statutory conditions will
not prevent the associates from attaining incorporation de
facto (for this they can gain by private act), but will prevent
them from exercising the right of eminent domain as against
a plaintiff who would be specially affected by their act. It
will accordingly be seen that in such a case it is strictly
proper to say that the associates have obtained absolutely no
rights whatever under the statute and that their incorporation has resulted from private act. From this analysis an
important practical conclusion results. It is this: that, inasmuch as the associates have not satisfied the terms of the
statutory grant they can be enjoined from acting under it,
but that inasmuch as they have in fact become incorporated
the plaintiff can establish his right and their liability only by
proceeding against them in corporateform. In other words,
the plaintiff cannot ignore the fact of incorporation and sue
the associates in their individual names. This discrimination
is conceived to be the true basis of the decision in the wellknown case of Attorney-General v. Stevens et al.5 In that
case the attorney-general at the request of a propertyowner filed an information in equity against a number
'Railroad Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio St. 276 (1855);
Railroad Co., 15 Ohio St. 21 (1864).
'Saxton (N. J.), 369 (1831).

Atkinson v.
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of individuals to restrain them from erecting a bridge
over a navigable stream. Among the grounds on which
the relator's contention was based were the following:
that the defendants, though purporting to be a corporation, had organized irregularly under their charter and
that certain prescriptions of the charter respecting the filing
of a survey and location of the defendants' railroad had not
been complied with. The chancellor refused the injunction.
In so far as the basis of the complaint against the associates
was that they were irregularly organized he gave substantially the answer suggested above as the first of the two
reasons why an inquiry into the irregularities should be
refused: "The corporation," he said, "is now organized,
and if acting without authority, is liable to be brought at any
time before a competent tribunal in a mode the legality of
which cannot, as I apprehend, be questioned." While conceding that the unauthorized erection of a bridge across a
navigable stream was a public nuisance which should be enjoined at the information of the attorney-general, he pointed
out that in order to grant an injunction against the defendants as individuals it would be necessary for him to ignore
the fact that they were de facto incorporated. He used this
language: "The information in this case seeks to avoid
that principle. It does not bring the company into court
and proceed against them as duly incorporated, but it proceeds against certain individuals, and sets up that the Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company, under which those individuals claim to act, has not and never
had legal existence, that the stock was never subscribed for
according to law, and that all subsequent proceedings are
void." Here is a clear recognition of the correctness of the
view stated above to the effect that where associates have
in fact attained incorporation a plaintiff can challenge their
exercise of a right which they have failed to obtain only
by proceeding against them in corporate form and not by
undertaking to ignore their incorporation and to proceed
against them as individuals. The situation is the same as
if a corporation were regularly organized and a question
were raised respecting the possession by the associates of
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the right of eminent domain. In such a case it has been
held that an action of ejectment will lie in favor of one
whose land the associates have occupied without chartered
warrant.6 The decision in Attorney-General v. Stevens is
therefore a precedent for a refusal to ignore de facto corporate existence, but it is not an authority for the proposition that the courts will not inquire into the existence or nonexistence of the right of eminent domain.7
The importance of the distinction between questions relating to formal action in the common name and those concerning the existence or non-existence of substantial rights
is a distinction of the utmost importance. Had it always
been recognized, much of the confusion in the cases would
have been avoided. Let it be supposed that associates who
have organized either regularly or irregularly claim the
right to do an act not ordinarily incident to incorporationas, for example, the right to occupy a public highway with
tracks. An abutting owner ought not to be permitted to
question the right to act in the common name or to raise
any other question which concerns merely the mode in
which action is to be taken. Neither ought he to be permitted to show that the associates who have received a grant
from the state have rendered themselves liable to have a
forfeiture declared. The state is not a party to the proceeding and it will be futile to try a forfeiture issue in a case
in which no decree of forfeiture can be pronounced. On the
other hand, the abutting owner ought to be permitted to
ePhillips v. Dunkirk, etc., R. R. Co., 78 Pa. 177 (1875).
, Attorney-General v. Stevens was followed with approval in National
Docks R. R. Co. v. CentralR. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755 (88o).
In this
case the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from exercising the
right of eminent domain in such manner as to build its road across the
plaintiff's tracks. The chancellor had granted an injunction "not
because this corporation threatens to assail any rights of the complainants which, if lawfully organized, it would not be permitted to
invade, but because it is a corporation de facto merely and not de jure."
On appeal the court were of opinion that the injunction could not be
maintained upon this ground and proceeded to consider the other
reasons alleged in support of it, among others the contention that the
general railroad act was unconstitutional and that the right of eminent
domain could not be delegated. It is clearly implied in the opinion
that if either of these contentions could be made good the plaintiff
would be entitled to an injunction. The court were, however, with the
defendant on both points and the injunction was dissolved.
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show that as a matter of substance the associates never
received a grant of the right to lay tracks upon the highway in question or that the grant has expired by its own limitation. As a matter of fact, the confusion of the distinct
questions of form and substance has in many cases led to a
denial of the standing of the plaintiff to object to the action
of the associates and the cases have been disposed of by the
statement that no question respecting corporate action can
be raised in a collateral proceeding.
The mischief resulting from such a rule led the Pennsylvania Legislature to pass the Act of June i9,1871 (P. L.
1361). The act provides that in all proceedings in courts
of law or equity in which it is alleged that the rights or
franchises of other corporations are injured or invaded by
any corporation claiming a right to do the act from which
such injury results it shall be the duty of the court in which
such proceedings are had to examine, inquire, and ascertain
whether such corporation does in fact possess the right and
franchise to do such injurious act, and if such right or franchise has not been zonferred upon such corporation such
courts, if exercising equitable power, shall by injunction
restrain such injurious acts." This act having been passed,
an attempt was at once made to ignore the distinction under
discussion by going to the other extreme and construing the
act as giving to a plaintiff the right to raise every question
which could be raised in a proceeding instituted by the state.
Fortunately the court refused to adopt this view of the
statute and in Western Penna R. R. Co.'s Appeals 8 made
"The Act
precisely the distinction above suggested.
of 1871," said the court, "contemplates nothing more
than that it shall be made to appear from the charter
that the corporation has the power to do the particular act in controversy and which involves some right of the
contestant, but when we get beyond this we assume something with which we have no business in a collateral proceeding: we assume to assert the rights of a third party,
the commonwealth." This was said in a case in which an
8 io4 Pa. 399

(1883).
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attempt was made to restrain the defendant from crossing
the plaintiff's tracks at grade for the reason that the defendant associates, though confessedly once possessing the right
to lay tracks beyond the plaintiff's line, were alleged to have
laid themselves open to a declaration of forfeiture by reason
of non-user. In a subsequent decision 9 the Supreme Court
approved an able opinion of Endlich, J., in the court below
in the course of which he observed, "The standing then of
the defendant company to call upon the court under the
Act of 1871 to inquire into the power of the plaintiff corporation to do that which it prays to be permitted to do here
must be given by the fact that that act would constitute
an injury to the private rights of the defendant, not by the
fact that it may involve danger to the public or wrong to
the city of Reading." Consistently with this view it has
been held that the plaintiff has no standing except where
there is a direct interference with his rights and that a
chancellor will not inquire into the defendant's authority
where the plaintiff's grievance is merely a diminution of
traffic or other consequential injury.10
Subsequent to these decisions the very question was presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which is involved in the suppositious case just put-namely, the question of the right of an abutting owner to challenge the right
of a manufacturing corporation without the power of eminent domain to maintain railroad tracks upon a highway.
The court held that the plaintiff had under the Act of 1871
a standing to compel the removal."
Summing up the discussion of the topic under consideration, the following conclusions may be stated: that in no
case will a court either of law or equity inquire at the instance
of a private citizen into the right of associates to act in corporate form; that in no case will a court of equity, even at
the instance of the attorney-general, inquire into the right
of associates to act in corporate form; that either a court
of law or a court of equity will at the instance of a private
'Penna., etc.. R. R. v. P. and R. R. R., i6o Pa. 277, 1894.
"Penna R. R. v. Street Rwy. Co., 176 Pa. 559 (1896).
Hopkins v. Catasauqua Mfg. Co. et aL, i8o Pa. '99 (1897).
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citizen inquire whether or not associates possess the substantive right to do acts directlyaffecting the interest of the plaintiff; and thatwhere a statute exists expressly recognizing the
right of a court to inquire into the authority for corporate
action it will be so construed as to limit the inquiry to
questions of substance as distinguished from questions of
form; and, in the case of substantial rights, to an investigation only of their acquisition by the associates and not
to a consideration of whether the associates have rendered
themselves liable to a judgment of forfeiture.
III. THE RIGHT TO SUE IN THE COMMON NAME.-It is
a rule of common law procedure that the plaintiffs, no matter how numerous, must appear upon the record in their own
names. It is only in equity that one is permitted to sue
as the representative of a class. In the case of partners
the rule requires that the name of each partner shall appear,
followed by the formula "trading as A & B." The right
to adopt for purposes of litigation a single name which
may be placed upon the record with the same legal effect
as if the names of all the associates were set out at length
is a right which is regarded as an incident of incorporation.
While the right to a common name is undoubtedly a valuable right, it might well be regarded as one attainable without public consent. It is natural, therefore, to find in the
case of irregularly organized associations that the courts
rarely if ever permit a defendant to defeat recovery by
questioning the right of the associates to sue in the common
name. It is, of course, true that the courts have not explicitly
recognized the situation as involving the right of associates to attain incorporation by their own act. Just as in
the other cases which have been considered, the attempt has
been made to explain the result by reference to collateral
attack, estoppel, or contract. On this head the contract
theory is the favorite with the courts. If by his contract the
defendant has recognized the associates as organized under
a common name, they may bring suit in that name and he
will not be permitted to defeat recovery. It is sometimes
intimated that the use of the common name in the contract
is evidence of the existence of a corporation. Thus where
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a defendant made a promissory note in favor of the "Cincinnati Type Foundry Company" it was held that a verdict
and judgment for the plaintiff would be sustained though
there was no other evidence than the note itself. "In this
class of cases," said the court, "it would seem, after all, that
the courts have proceeded upon a rule of evidence rather
than the strict doctrine of estoppel. They have treated the
contract with a party by a name implying corporation
really as evidence of the existence of the corporation more
than as an estoppel to disprove such fact." In a subsequent
part of the opinion the court adds: "This doctrine of
estoppel as applied to contracts with corporations needs
further examination; but it is not important in this case
and we shall not here pursue it. The decision of this case will
rest upon another ground." 12 Obviously there is no question
of estoppel in such a situation. As for the contract theory,
it may be said to be both too broad and too narrow. It is
too broad: because no reason can be given why one who
has made a contract with partners in a firm name should
not be liable to suit by them in that name; but such is not
the law.1 3 It is too narrow: in that it does not suffice to explain cases in which associates irregularly organized are
permitted to bring suit in their common name against a tort4
feasor.1

An interesting phase of the question presented itself in
Stoutimore v. Clark.'5 B and others gave a promissory
note to "the Missouri City Savings Bank." Upon B's
failure to pay, judgment was entered upon the note
in favor of the bank. A, the holder of a lien on
B's land, filed a bill in order to compel a sale for the
satisfaction of the lien. The bank was made a defendant
by order of the court and set up the lien of the judgment.
C, a co-defendant, holder of another lien, sought by cross
Cincinnati Type Foundry Co., 14 Ind. 89 (i86o).
'Rex v.v.Harrison,
8 T. R. 508 (18oo).
See, for example, the Stockton, etc., Co. v. The Stockton, etc.,
R. R. Co., 45 Cal. 68o (1873), where a corporation de facto was permitted to maintain an action in the common name against one who
had trespassed upon common property.
Mo. 471 (1879).
'lones
14

270
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bill to impeach the validity of the lien of the bank on the
ground that the bank had not been regularly incorporated.
The court upheld the lien of the bank. There was here no
basis for-alleging an estoppel. It might have been said
that B, by contracting with the associates in the common
name, had impliedly agreed that they might sue him in it.
Though C was not a party to the contract, yet if B was
bound, the judgment was valid and C could not complain.
Or it might have been said that incorporation had in fact
been attained in spite of irregularity and that the right to
sue in the common name was an incident of incorporation.
The court, however, preferred to say that in the suit upon
the note B would have been "estopped" from disputing the
corporate existence and that therefore the judgment was
valid. This is, in substance, the contract theory. The court
also thought that as C had derived his rights from B subsequent to the bank's judgment he could have no better
position than B. This suggestion seems to have been superfluous; for as the judgment was valid, its lien was effective
against all the world. The result reached is undoubtedly
sound. That B could not have made defence on the ground
that suit was brought in the common name is clear from
the authorities. "The plaintiff," said the court in Bank
v. McDonald,'6 "being a corporation de facto, and the defendant having contracted with it as such, the legality of the
organization cannot be impeached by him when sued upon
his contract."
A class of cases is sometimes confused with the cases
under discussion which in reality involve a different question. Let it be supposed that B promises to take and pay
for shares in a corporation thereafter to be formed and that
(on some one of the theories already discussed) he is afterwards sued by the associates in their common name. The
question is whether he may defend on the ground that the
organization is irregular. Here, it will be perceived, the
objection goes deeper than a mere dilatory defence which
denies the right to sue in the common name. If this were
26

i3o Mass. 264 (188I).
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the only point involved, B's defence should not be permitted.
The substantial question, however, is whether the associates
who are suing for B's contribution have performed the
conditions of the contract. If the organization is irregular,
the people, through the attorney-general, may forfeit the
charter and destroy or impair the value of the common property. Until the associates have formed an invulnerable
organization they have not performed their part of the
contract. A covenant to settle property upon a female relative when married might well be construed as contemplating
a licensed marriage, regularly contracted. A refusal to convey where mere cohabitation and reputation had made a
de facto marriage should not be regarded as a breach of the
covenant. Yet such a case is far weaker than the one under
consideration.- Here the question does not concern the
status of another, but the status which the defendant will
himself occupy if compelled to perform the contract. It is
as if B, under contract of marriage, were sued for breach
of promise by the plaintiff, who had offered to cohabit with
B but had declined to obtain a license and submit to a marriage ceremony. It is clear that B would not be liable.
Without always clearly stating the principle, the cases as
a rule permit the subscriber to defend on the ground of
irregularity. "That contract," it was said in Indianapolis
Furnace Co. v. Herkimcr,17 "was, in legal effect, that the
defendant would take and pay for the stock subscribed
for in case the organization should be perfected and
the corporation brought into legal existence, and not
otherwise." The court here distinguished between contracts with existing corporations and those in which future
incorporation is contemplated. "The ground upon which
a party who has contracted with a corporation as such is
estopped to deny its existence is, that by his contract he has
recognized the existence of the corporation." It is often
said, as is implied in the language just quoted, that if the
contract is with an existing corporation the defendant may
not set up the irregularity of its organization as a defence
"746

Ind. 142 (1873).
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to an action upon his subscription. If, as has been seen,
the objection goes merely to the right to sue in the common
name, this statement is sound. It is submitted, however,
that if B subscribes to the stock of an existing corporation
and subsequently discovers that its charter is vulnerable he
should be permitted to resist payment, just as in the case
of subscriptions made prior to organization.' s
George Wharton Pepper.
(To be concluded.)
"The remaining topics-Amenability to Suit in the Common Name,
Conveying and Receiving Title to Property, and the Effect of Irregularities Upon the Relation of Associates inter se-will be discussed
in a third and final article.

